1984 Delhi Sikh Genocide - Statement Of Commissioner Of Police

N-49, Panchsheela Park,
New Delhi-110017.

26th January, 2002

The Secretary,
Justice Nanavati Commission of Enquiry,
1984 anti-Sikh riots

Sir,

Kindly refer to your summons No.A-38 / JNCI / 2001-Admn. Date 14.2.2002, directing me to appear and give evidence before the Commission on the 5th March, 2002, at 3.30 pm.

I would like to submit that I had appeared on April 8 and 9, 1986, before the Justice Ranganath Misra Commission of Enquiry, set up on April 26, 1985 with the following terms of reference:

(i) to inquire into the allegations in regard to the incidents of organised violence which took place in Delhi following the assassination of the late Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi;

(ii) to recommend measures which may be adopted for prevention recurrence of such incidents.

A photo copy of the statement submitted by me before that Commission is enclosed herewith for your kind perusal. This may kindly be treated as my deposition before the Justice Nanavati Commission.

I would request that in case any clarifications or points are required, the same may be intimated to me and I would submit my reply to the same

Yours faithfully,

Sd/- 26.2.2002

(S.C. Tandon)

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1. I had gone to attend the CRP parade at Jharoda Kalan on the morning of October 31, 1984. While the parade was in progress, I was informed at 0930 hours regarding the receipt of a wireless message that firing had taken place at the Prime Minister's House. The wireless operator of my vehicle asked for details.

In return, the message stated that the Commissioner of Police should reach the spot. I immediately left the parade with Addl. CP/CID, R.K. Ohri. Soon after leaving Jharoda, a message came on wireless that a constable had opened fire and the Prime Minister had been hit by a bullet. It was first stated that the Prime Minister had been taken to Willingdon Hospital.

However, we were later informed that the prime Minister had been taken to the All India Institute of Medical sciences. While we were en route at Janakpurl, a message was received that the LG desired me to talk to him.

2. I reached the AIIMS with Addl. CP/CID at 1005 hours. DCP/South District and the local police officers were all there. Crowds had started collecting on the Aurobindo Marg outside the AIIMS, and the South District Police under DCP South had made arrangements to keep the AIIMS complex clear. I stopped there for about half an hour to supervise the police arrangements and gave instructions.

I also got an order issued f from there through the South District Control Room at 1028 hours to all DCPs to look to the maintenance of law and order in their respective areas. This message was also relayed by south District Control Room to ACPs and SHOs of his districts. While I was there, I received a message that the GOC Delhi Area wanted me to speak to him on telephone.

The message gave his office and residence telephone numbers. I then went to the Prime Minister's House at I, Safdarjung Road to see the situation and arrangements there. I met the LG there Addl.CP/Range New Delhi, Addl. CP/S&T and DCP/New Delhi were present there, and had made law and order arrangements there.

3. After reaching PHQ, I summoned all police officers present there for a meeting. While they were coming, I telephone Major General J.S. Jamwal, GOC Delhi Area, on his RAX number. He asked me about the shooting of the Prime Minister.

I gave him the details, stating that two of our Sikh security personnel had fired at the Prime Minister inside her residence. I requested him to alert his units and keep them at stand to. He told me that he did not have troops in Delhi, but would get them by the evening. He said they would be called from Meerut which was the nearest place in his area.

4. I called a meeting of Addl. CP/CID, Addl.CP/Range Delhi, Addl. CP/AP & T, Addl. CP/ Administration and DCPs at Headquarters. It was suggested by Addl. CP/Range New Delhi, Gautam Kaul from P.M. House on wireless that police force should be deployed in accordance with the emergency plan. Addl.CP/ Kulbir Singh reported that he had very little force, and that some of it had been sent to the Prime Minister's House for traffic arrangements there.

I then got instructions issued to all district DCPs on wireless that patrolling should be intensified and the police presence strengthened in communally sensitive areas, especially in Gurdwaras, temples, mosques etc., special attention paid to vital installations, and that a sharp look-out should be kept on mischief mongers, bad characters and goondas. The district Commissioners of Police were also asked to keep a handy reserve ready for meeting any unforeseen situation. This message was issued by Addl.CP/CID, R.K. Ohri at 1250 hours.

A message was also sent by DCP/SB at 1230 hours for maintenance of strict vigil at all vital installations, railway stations, the- air-port, gurdwaras and other places of worship, market places, colleges and schools, and all communally sensitive areas; intensive mobile patrolling should be introduced in ail sensitive areas and crowded places, and maximum uniformed police presence should be maintained all over the city. It was also directed that a situation report should be sent to the Control Room every hour.

S.C. Tandon: Allowed Sikh genocide to occur during his term in office.

5. All available forces of the Delhi Police, including the Home Guards, were mobilised for patrolling and as reserves at strategic places. This task was coordinated by Kulbir Singh, Addl. CP/AP&T who set up a separate control room at the New Police Lines, Kingsway Camp. I also urged the Ministry of Home Affairs to provide maximum police force from the para-military forces for our assistance.

6. The strength of reserves of the Central police forces in Delhi was very much depleted, as practically all of them had been deployed in Punjab, Assam and elsewhere. We could get only 17 companies which were available in the capital. This included the CRP force which had participated in the parade at Jharoda Kalan that morning.

A sizeable portion of the available reserve (6 companies) had to be given to DCP south for deployment at the AIIMS, as large crowds had started gathering on the road outside and making anxious enquiries about the condition of the Prime Minister. Similarly, nearly 3 companies were given to DCP/New Delhi for arrangements around I Safdarjung Road.

7. The district DCPs and the Special Branch unit maintained a watch on the reactions among different sections of the community, the communal fall-out, activities of anti-social elements, and closure of shops and markets. All available man power in the districts was put on duty in uniform. Regular motor-cycle patrolling was enforced, particularly in the city areas.

ACPs and SHOs did patrolling and were directed to concentrate on checking of communally sensitive areas, gurdwaras, railway stations, colleges and schools in their respective areas and give regular situation reports. They were directed to take precautions for the prevention of communal clashes and give special protection to gurdwaras in their respective areas. The inter-state border roads connecting Delhi with Haryana, particularly the Singhu border on National Highway No. 1 from Punjab/ Haryana was sealed.

Following reports regarding the closure of shops in the evening after the official announcement of the death of the Prime Minister, all ACPs and SHOs were further directed to display police presence on the roads in order to prevent any untoward incidents. The DCPs and Addl.SCPs themselves patrolled the affected areas and checked the patrolling done by ACPs and SHO. The protection provided to various VIPs and other vulnerable persons was also strengthened.

8. I was summoned to the Prime Minister's House at 1257 hours and met S/K.L. Fotedar and V. S. Tripathi. There was concern over the death of SI Beant Singh who could have during interrogation given details of a conspiracy, if any. I was advised that adequate arrangements should be made for the security of Satwant Singh, who was admitted in RML Hospital. I reiterated these instructions to DCP/New Delhi.

9. At about 1600 hours I received a-telephonic call at my office that the Prime Minister's office was unhappy over the delay in completion of the legal formalities by the police, which was delaying the release of the body. There was also a demand that the body should not be subjected to post mortem.

I discussed the matter with Addl.CP/Range, New Delhi, Gautam Kaul and Addl. CP/CID, R.K. Ohri, and later with DCP/New Delhi and SHO Tughlak Road at P.S. Tughlak Road. We were of the view that the post mortem was necessary in the interests of the criminal case regarding the assassination of the Prime Minister.

We thereafter went to the AIIMS to discuss the matter with the authorities. Addl.CP/ Range New Delhi. Informed G. Parthasarathy that the post mortem roust be performed, as failure to do so would lead to legal complications in the criminal case. I thereafter returned to PHO.

10. A leading national daily of Delhi had published a special supplement with banner headlines regarding the assassination of the prime Minister. This came out at about 1400 hours. BBC had also broadcast the news. The news regarding the shooting of the Prime Minister by two Sikh security guards had already gained currency in the town.

The official announcement regarding the death of the Prime Minister was, however, not made till late in the evening. I sent a message to DGs of Police of the surrounding States to prevent organised movement of crowds towards Delhi. In view of the press and radio news, large crowds had gathered outside the All India institute of Medical sciences and had begun to grow more and more restive.

The DCP South and his force were tied up in trying to control the crowds outside the AIIMS. He was given some additional force and officers. A report came at about 1730 hours that members of the public had set fire to a car at the crossing of Safdarjung Hospital on Aurobindo Marg, but it could not be ascertained to whom -the car belonged,

A message came at 1800 hours that crowds were stopping Sikhs coming on motor-cycles or cars, taking off their turbans and setting them on fire. Again, a report came at 1805 hours that a motor-cycle had been set on fire on the safdarjung flyover This was followed by another report at 1839 hours that the crowds were spread far and wide, and had set fire to a bus and a scooter.

The report also stated that the crowds were adopting hit and run tactics, running away as soon as the police reached the spot. I promulgated Section 144 Cr.P.C. and issued a wireless message to that effect at 1927 hours. A wireless message was also got issued at 1930 hours by DCP/SB to all district DCPs, with copy to Addl. CPs informing them that incidents of assault on Sikhs and damage of vehicles had been reported in certain areas, and directing them to ensure utmost vigilance and maximum uniformed police presence, till late in the evening, the following day and in the next few days, as also mobility of force and continuous motor-cycle patrolling.

A Message was also sent at 2150 hours by Addl. CP/Administration to all district DCPs, ACPs and SHOs directing them to ensure adequate patrolling in their respective areas and personally check the same, and that steps be taken to prevent incidents of looting, arson and harassment to members of the minority community.

11. The Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, S.C. Bajpeyi and the Home Secretary, Delhi Administration, Kaushal Kumar had both come to my office and we left for the area at about 1930 hours to see the situation for ourselves Addl. CP/CID R.K. Ohri also accompanied us. We went to South Extension where some shops had been set on fire, and then went to Defence Colony where, I recall two instances of arson, one in a shop in the market and the other of a car parked in a house.

As reported by DCP south, the crowds would disperse before the arrival of the police. In the meantime, ACP Defence Colony and SHO Defence Colony also arrived on the spot. They stated that the crowds were from Kotla Mubarakpur and I directed them to take action against the mischief mongers and make arrests. 45 persons were arrested by the local police.

Thereafter we went to Hemkunt via Ring Road and Lajpat Nagar. Under the Defence Colony fly-over, we found one or two scooters burning. The crowds, however, ran away as soon as our vehicles were sighted. Hemkunt was normal. We then went to Yusuf Sarai where the doors of a gurdwara had been set on fire. The police tried to put out the fire with sand and water in the absence of the fire-brigade.

I met the Addl.DCP south, Vjay Chadha, who had also come there on receipt of a message. We thereafter went to the AIIMS/ Safdarjang Hospital crossing where we met DCP south. A report came there of trouble further down on the Ring Road at its crossing with Africa Avenue. We went to the spot and found that crowds had set fire to a vehicle.

The crowds again ran away on hearing the sound of our siren and dispersed before we could reach the spot. We thereafter went to P.S. vinay Nagar where we found that the doors of a gurdwara had been set on fire-earlier. No crowds were however present there. Thereafter we came back to PHQ, and reported the matter to the LG.

12. The LG accompanied by the ,R.K. Sharma, DCP/HQ and the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, P.P. Srivastava, himself paid a visit later to the affected areas of south district, returning after midnight.

13. Reports were also received regarding some incidents of arson and looting of Sikh shops in the Indira Market, Sabzi Mandi and Azad Market in North district. Addl. CP/Range Delhi and DCP/North were patrolling the area. It was reported by Addl. CP/Rnnge Delhi at 0039 hours that no casualty had taken place, Addl. Cp/Range Delhi had undertaken preventive arrests, and also organised flag marches in the affected areas.

14. In view of the incidents of violence and looting that had taken place in South district and North district, a circular was issued under the signatures of Addl. CP/administration, directing all district and unit DCPs to put the entire police force in the Union territory of Delhi on the alert and take adequate steps for the maintenance of law and order and communal harmony. The aim and objectives of the arrangements were;

(i) maintenance of law and order, and crowd control,

(ii) adequate security of Wips,

(iii) regulation of crowds coming to pay homage, and suitable arrangements for the funeral procession,

(iv) maintenance of communal harmony and

(v) protection to places of worship and vital installations.

Instructions were issued for mobilisation of the entire force of the Delhi Police for protection to the police armouries and magazines, posting of armed pickets at vulnerable place and communally sensitive areas, particularly those with mixed population, and strengthening of police patrolling near gurdwaras, shopping centres, etc.

It was also stated that all steps should be taken to prevent any incident of arson, and looting or damage to life and property. Suitable preventive action to be taken against known bad characters and anti-social elements, who usually create problem at the time of disturbances, and against rabid communal elements who ,may create mischief.

Special care was urged for protection to the Central Secretariat, Parliament House, AIR and Doordarshan, preventing any act of sabotage, and security precautions strengthened for VVIPs who were the likely targets of extremists. DCP/PCR was directed to ensure that all PCR vans were commissioned for patrolling and sensitive areas were covered more extensively than other areas, and to personally brief the police personnel of these vans.

DCP/Special Branch was directed to ensure that a close watch, was kept on the general reaction in the city, and to pass on information of interest to senior officers without delay. DCPs in charge of districts/units were also directed to collect intelligence in their own spheres and pass on necessary intelligence to their senior officers from time to time. All officers were directed to see that the provisions of section 144 Cr.P.c. were strictly implemented.

15. I was called again to the prime Minister's House that night after I had returned to the PHQ. Dr. P.C. Alexander, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister told me that it had been decided to replace the Addl. CP/S&T, H.D. Pillai and DCP/Special Security District, G.R. Gupta the following morning, and directed me to select their substitutes who would be asked to take over their respective charges the next morning.

16. I went to the office of the DCP/security, Ajay Agrawal to check the security arrangements that were being made for the laying of wreaths by the VVips and the channelising of the crowds coming to Tin Murti Bhawan for 'darshan' of the body of the deceased Prime Minister.

17. On return to Police Headquarters, I sent another message at 0220 hours that adequate patrolling be provided from 0500 hours, effective preventive action be taken against bad characters, and full use be made of motor-cycle patrolling.

18. I later went to the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital to ensure that Sh. Satwant Singh, who had been admitted there in custody, was given adequate protection. I got the arrangements strengthened and also sent a message to the DCP/ Crime, R.C. Kohli, ACPs Chopra and Tek Chand, and the DCP/New Delhi, B.K. Gupta to come there.

Thereafter, I went to Teen Murti House to see the barricading being done both inside and outside the premises for the control of the crowds which would be coming to have darshan of the deceased Prime Minister. Addl.Cpl. CID, DCP/New Delhi and DCP/security were also there.

I returned to Dr. Ram Kanohar Lohia Hospital and gave directions to DCP/New Delhi to ensure that the arrangements were duly strengthened and that no person, other than authorised doctors or police personnel, was able to have access to Satwant Singh's room or the corridor outside the same.

DCP/police Control Room accordingly requisitioned two sections of commandos of DAP for reporting to the Lohia Hospital at 0600 hours latest that morning. I directed the DCP/crime and the two ACPs to ensure that the interrogation of Satwant Singh was continued round the clock by personnel of the Crime Branch along with those of the IB team.

19. The Ministry of Home Affairs had requisitioned force from the Central Police organisations, and from the State police force. The strength of outside force increased to 51 companies by the morning of November I, which was distributed in the different areas in accordance with their immediate demands.

20. I reached Teen Murti House at 0630 hours to supervise the arrangements there. The President, the Vice President, the new prime Minister, other VIPs, heads of missions, the Lt. Governor, Delhi and other dignitaries were to visit Teen Murti House to pay homage to the late Prime Minister by laying wreaths on the body, and crowds were to file past the body, which was brought at 0733 hours from I Safdarjang Road, and kept in the porch of Teen Murti House for darshan.

The arrangements had to be properly organised to ensure that there was no stampede both inside and out-side Teen Murti House, no harassment was caused to members of the Sikh community coming to pay homage, and protection of the President, Prime Minister and foreign VIPs by segregating them from the main crowds, and preventing Infiltration of any unauthorised persons inside the roots of Teen Murti House where the dignitaries were to assemble.

The crowds which collected were in a sullen and hostile mood, and some of them raised angry slogans when some Sikh police officers tried to regulate and control them. After the arrangements were made and the darshan started in an orderly manner, I left for Police Headquarters, as reports regarding disturbances in parts of South and North district had begun to come on wireless. On reaching PHJ, I found that the number of such reports was increasing and spread to Central district also.

I therefore called the LG on phone, and it was decided that we should requisition the services of the army. The LG contacted the OOC Delhi Area and informed me that the GOC was not willing to come directly to me, but wanted to have the meeting in the presence of the LG. He also told me that the GOC had informed him that he could come at 1300 hours.

21. In view of the situation in different parars of the city, I Issued instructions to Addl. CPs Range and DOPs at 1011 hours that the sensitive areas should be divided into sectors and sub-sectors, and mobile and foot patrolling undertaken. I also decided that vehicles be hired, and all efforts be made to curb violence, arson and looting.

22. On receiving a report at 1055 hours regarding arson in a gurdwara in P.S. Sadar Bazar, I rushed with DCP Headquarters-II, J.P. Singh. I-met Addl.CP/Range Delhi and DCP/Central at different places on my way. On reaching the area, I found a dhaba adjacent to the gurdwara and the doors of the gurdwara in flames. The crowds were shouting that Sikhs were firing from the first floor of the gurdwara and had taken two hindus inside.

A hindu youth among the crowd suddenly came running with a bleeding injury on his chest, stating that he had been shot. The situation had become explosive and piquant with the crowds intent upon storming the gurdwara and assaulting the Sikhs in the gurdwara. Regardless of our personal safety, I reached upstairs with OCP/HQ-II and took into custody two Sikhs who were suspected to have fired.

l got them sent to P.S. Sadar Bazar under escort of ACp Hari Dev. We then dispersed the crowds gathered outside by lathi charge and tear gas. Thereafter I received a report that arson and violence had broken out in Chandni Chowk and Moti Bazar, and demands for deployment of more force in that area. DCP/central sent a message at 1216 hours seeking orders for the imposition of curfew in the area of P.S. Hauz Kazi.

I immediately sent a reply, ordering the imposition of curfew in the area. While coming to PHQ, we dispersed a crowd which had assembled in Chawari Bazar to loot a shop, and arrested those persons who were brought to PHQ, and 'handed them over to the local police'.

23. As soon as I reached PHQ, I got a telephone call from the Home Secretary, Government of India, M.M.K. Wall stating that arrangements to Teen Murti House had broken down and directing me to go to the spot. I accordingly rushed to Teen Murti House and found that the barricades had broken down.

A number of people were jumping into the house over the railings, while a large crowd had collected outside the gate, and were exerting pressure to get entry inside, endangering the lives of a number of people, including women and old persons, who were stuck between the main gate and the crowds, and were in danger of being trampled or suffocated to death.

We used tear-gas and lathi charge to disperse the crowds, and with great difficulty and risk to police personnel, were able to rescue the women and elderly persons from death and injury, and restored order on the spot. Addl. CP Range was taking action inside to control the crowds. Police reinforcements were summoned and the arrangements were strengthened. Regulation and control of crowds was a purely police function in which the army had no role.

24. When had left Teen Murti House, I received two messages from DCP/South at 1303 hours and at 1307 hours seeking Imposition of curfew in the areas of Bhogal in P.S. Nizamuddin and in P.S. Sriniwaspuri respectively where disturbances had broken out. I gave my approval for the same, asking DCP South to impose curfew wherever he considered necessary in his area.

25. I stopped at PHQ on return from Teen Murti House. I discussed the-situation with Addl. CP/CID. We got a message Issued by DCP/SB to all district DCPs informing them of the various incidents that had taken place in different parts of the city, as well as the stampede at Teen Murti House, the arrival of large crowds from the villages to pay homage, and the danger of their emotions being roused. Directions were given for maximum uniformed patrolling and stern dealing with the situation and immediate dispersal of mob.

26. I thereafter went to Chandni Chowk to see the. situation there on my way to Raj Niwas. The situation was under control. Addl.CP Range and ECP North were there. I then went to Raj Niwas where Maj. General J.S. Jarowal, GOC Delhi Area had already reached. We held a meeting with Maj. General Jamwal ill the room of the LG.

We requested General Jamwal for the deployment of his men in aid of civil power throughout the Union I, territory. Maj. General Jamwal, however, stated that he did not have enough units and insisted that he could only cover two contiguous districts, preferably those adjacent to his headquarters in Delhi Cantt.

I then suggested that he should put his men in position in South and Central districts which had been reported to be the most disturbed. The army deployed a strength of one battalion each in Central District and South district that afternoon.

27. After returning to PHQ from the. LG's residence, I intercepted a message, on wireless from the DCP/New Delhi to the control room seeking deployment of the BSF at Gurdwara Rakabganj as firing .was taking place from the top of the gurdwara. I ordered that a rescue company of the DSF be sent to the gurdwara. I also rushed to Gurdwara Kakabganj, where I found a charred body lying on the road.

Sikhs were present on the roof of the gurdwara with guns, while CRP personnel had taken position behind trees on the opposite side of .the road to return the fire. A large-crowd was standing near the round-about outside the Parliament House, shouting angry slogans and alleging that Sikhs had taken six of their men (Hindus) inside the gurdwara to kill and burn them.

A petrol pump on the Church Road crossing was also on fire. I jumped inside the gurdwara compound with DCP Headquarters-11 and a Dy.SP of the CRP, and found the body of a Sikh who had been battered to death near the play I prevailed upon a granthi there to persuade the Sikhs on the terrace to abandon firing.

Three hindu servants and their families who were inside the gurdwara were brought outside the premises. This had the desired effect of satisfying the mob that no harm had been done to any hindu. I found outside that Addl. C./ Range New Delhi had arrived, and DCP/Mew Delhi' had also reached the spot from, Connaught Circus and they had kept the crowd under check.

Kamal Nath M.P. was also there and helped in persuading the crowd to disperse. Had I not taken the initiative to enter the gurdwara at risk, and brought the situation under control, there would have been avoidable bloodshed and arson. I thereafter returned to PHQ.

28. Since the situation had flared up in several parts of the city and deaths had been reported, I ordered the imposition of curfew in the affected areas of North district. Central district and South district with effect from 1800 hours.

Even earlier, the curfew was imposed on the recommendations of the DCPs concerned in affected areas of South and Central districts. DCP Special Branch also issued another message regarding the need to review the force requirements, and those regarding vehicles, tear gas and firearms for the night and the following days.

29. At PHQ I was informed that a meeting would be taken at 1730 hours by the Home Sinister in the Cabinet Secretariat that evening and directing me to attend the same. However, a little before I was to proceed there, a report was received regarding trouble at West Patel where a Sikh had opened fire from the first floor of his house, on a crowd which had set the ground floor on fire.

I directed Addl.CP/CID to go to the meeting. I rushed to the spot and found a large mob in front of the house of a retired Sikh Air Force officer, the lower floor of which was on fire. Four dead bodies of Hindus were lying on the road. DCP/Central had gone to the roof of the neighbouring house at the back and tried to persuade the owner to stop firing and surrender to the police, assuring him that no harm would come to him.

We sent frantic messages to get the fire brigade but the same did not arrive. Meanwhile, an army unit under a Major arrived at the spot to assist DCP Central, who was able to persuade the Sikh to surrender, took him into protective custody, and rescued his family.

30. I went to the Cabinet Secretariat to attend the meeting taken by the Home Minister where I had earlier deputed .Addl.CP/CID on my behalf. En route, on receipt of a demand for force for South district needed for controlling disturbances in Naraina Vihar , I sent a message in reply at 1815 hours directing DCP/South to call the army deployed in his area.

On receipt of another message from Naraina Vihar that no army had come, I checked with DCP South about the arrival of the army. South reported at 1900 hours that the army units which had arrived there stated that they would patrol independently and that they were not for police assistance, and would function under the orders of a magistrate.

I replied that they should be informed that the district VCF and ACPs of South district were magistrates and they would have to work under them This position had already been explained to the GOC earlier.

31. The meeting taken by the Home Minister was attended among others by. the Cabinet Secretary, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, DIB, the Chief of the Army Staff, Chairman JIC, Special Secretary MHA LG Delhi, CS Delhi, myself and Addl. CP/CID.

The situation was reviewed and it was decided to make an announcement regarding imposition of curfew immediately, induct additional police force from wherever available to deal with law and order, plan the security arrangements for the funeral procession, and the security of about 100 foreign VIP delegations coming to attend the funeral.

It was decided that the army should be inducted in the whole of the Union territory in greater strength, and details should be worked out at a meeting to be taken by the LG with the police, army and MHA representatives. Further, the army should make arrangements to keep the Palam Delhi route clear as a large number of foreign WIPs were to use that route.

32. Following the above decisions, the LG convened a meeting in my office of officers of the Delhi Administration and Delhi Police at about 2030 hours, in which the development in the city were discussed. Special Secretary Home, Prem Kumar, Joint Secretary, Police, V.K. Jain and the GOC Delhi Area were also present.

It was pointed out by us that the police force provided was inadequate to effectively cover the whole of the Union territory and-also provide fool-proof arrangements for the funeral which had been fixed for 3.11.1984. We demanded 70 companies (at least one company each for 65 police stations). The Special Secretary, Home was asked by the LG to ensure that this strength was provided.

However, the strength provided was only 19 companies. We also reiterated to the GOC that he should inform his troops that district DCPs and ACPs had magisterial powers.

33. Apart from calls regarding reports of riots and violence, a large number of calls giving false information were also received in the Police Control Room from October 31 itself. For example, on November I evening, calls came from various high authorities, including Central Ministers that Sikhs in large numbers armed with carbines and weapons had collected in gurdwaras and elsewhere for attacking the hindu population.

All these reports on enquiry were found false. Another rumour spread later that night was that the water of Delhi had been poisoned. Such reports unnecessarily dispersed the force, to the detriment of areas where police presence was required. A call was even received (on 2.11.1984) from Kashtrapati Bhawan that 2000 Sardars had collected at Gurdwara Bangla sahib and were planning to attack Bishambhar Das Marg and Talkatora Marg.

34. An order was also issued at 2100 hours that any person indulging in loot or violence should be shot.

35. I also mobilised police officers of Delhi police working in other departments 'for duties in connection with the law and order situation'. These included Nikhil Kumar, singh, Addl.CP who had handed over charge of the Range less than ten days before and was on joining time, R.S. Gupta, former DCP Head- quarters-I and Y.S. Dhuria, DCP/CD.

The LG also placed LG Ins officers of the Delhi Administration at my disposal for deployment in different districts for the purpose of patrolling. These officers were provided with vehicles and a small police force for the purpose and added to the strength of our supervisory officers for control of law and order. A joint control room was also set up at the PCR.

36. After the LG's meeting, I paid a visit to South Delhi where reports regarding looting and arson in the areas of P.S. Sriniwaspuri i.e. Hari Nagar Ashram, Friends Colony and Kaharani Bagh had been received. I visited Maharani Bagh, Friends Colony and New Friends Colony areas and found that .the situation to be under control.

However, a large number of trucks were found to have been set on fire in the Nizamuddin and Hari Nagar Ashram areas and the area behind Bhogal where a number of Sikh transporters reside.

Thereafter I proceeded to old Delhi to P.S. Kingsway Camp where I found a sizeable number of Sikhs of the rural areas of Narela who had been evacuated by the police, and given shelter in one of the barracks of the police station.

37. While on my round, I got a message asking me to speak to the Cabinet Secretary on phone. I called him and give him the situation report. I also informed him of the problem, that the army unit in South district was refusing to take action without orders of a civilian magistrate. He took up the matter with the COAs.

38. On November 2 morning at about 0800 hours a report was received on wireless that Gurdwara Bala Sahib (in Sunlight Colony) had been set on fire and a number of children had been surrounded. It was also stated that bullets were being fired from the back of the gurdwara. I deducted the DCP/South to reach the spot and myself reached there.

I found that a shop had been broken open but the culprits had disappeared on seeing our vehicles The gurdwara was safe and Sikhs had taken shelter there for protection. The DCP/South and an army unit readied a few minutes after me and I left them there. Thereafter I reached PHQ.

39. I received a message directing me to reach the Cabinet Secretariat at 1130 hours for a minting there to finalise the arrangements for the funeral procession and the funeral of the late Prime Minister. Addl.CP/Range New Delhi, and Addl. CP/S&T were also called.

This meeting which was held in compliance with the decision taken in the meeting called by the Home Minister the previous evening, lasted for more than two and half hours. The route for the funeral procession had not yet been finalised. It was disclosed that there was a proposal that the funeral procession should go from India Gate vis. Kasturba Gandhi Marg, Connaught Place, Barakhamba Road, Sikandra Road and Tilak Bridge to the cremation ground.

It was also reported that the Prime Minister had expressed a desire to walk through out with the cortege, although efforts were being made to dissuade him from doing so. The meeting discussed the various arrangements that were to be made for the control of the crowds, maintenance of law and order and security of Wips on the route from Teen Kuril to the place of cremation and the cremation area itself.

Over 100 foreign Vips were expected to participate in the funeral and very elaborate arrangements requiring careful and meticulous planning were to be made. There was also the danger of threat to the security of the Prime Minister, the President, the Vice President and the various foreign Vips.

40. That afternoon the LG and I undertook a tour of East district via the Old Jamuna Bridge to see some of the affected areas. We wont to P.S. Shahadara where an array unit allotted to East district was just settling in. We thereafter visited the areas of Balbir Nagar and Durgapuri on our way to Seemapuri, but had to come back on a message from the Prime Minister's House for the LG. 1.

Thereafter went to the North district to see the arrangements there, including those of the army, and then returned to the Police Headquarters. The army moved in to cover all the districts only by late afternoon on 2.11.1984. An army officer was posted In the Police Control Room for liaison duties and similarly a police officer was posted at the headquarters of GOC Delhi Area.

41. While at PHQ, at about 1800 hours, we received a report that a riot had taken place at Trilokpuri, and dead bodies were lying on the scene occurrence. I directed the Addl.CP/Range Delhi to proceed immediately to Trilokpuri for enquiry.

He came back after about two hours and confirmed that Sikhs had been massacred in Trilokpuri. He found that the 5HO had not taken measures to protect these Sikhs, and had therefore arrested and suspended him and some of his staff. He had posted police force in the area.

42. The LG and I were summoned to the Prime Minister's House later that night at about 2215 hours where some of the local U.Ps were also present. They had complained to the Prime Minister that they would not get through to the police control room for securing police help as and when required.

I explained the position to the Prime Minister that there were 15 lines in the control room, and with the large number of messages coming in, it was quite likely that no line was free and many calls could not pass through to the control room.

43. The LG and I explained the situation to the Prime Minister and apprised him of the various steps we had taken to control the situation. We also informed that the Prime Minister intended to do a round of the affected areas that night. While I was at the Prime Minister's house a message came from the house of Capt. Satish Sharma living in Panch Shila Park that efforts had been made to set his house on fire.

This was confirmed on my enquiry. I therefore went to Panch shila Park as this was an area where very little trouble had been reported, but found the information to be incorrect. This was another such false reports. I thereafter returned to the Prime minister's House.

44. From the Prime Minister's House I went to the office of the DCP/Central district at about 0200 hours to discuss with Addl. CP/Range, DCP/5B, DCPs of Delhi Range, DCP/SB. ACPs and SHO deputed on duty there regarding the arrangements and deployment of force for the funeral of the late Prime Minister the following afternoon. I also visited the site of the cremation and saw the barricading put up there.

Thereafter I dame to the PHQ from where I got a message issued at 0300 hours to all I-CPs, reiterating the security of Gurdwaras and the use of maximum force for the protection of people taking shelter inside them. I also asked for compliance reports by 0600 hours.

45. At 0730 hours I went to the office of the GOC Delhi Area with Addl.CP, Nikhil Kumar to discuss the arrangements and finalise the coordination between the police and the army units deployed on the route of the funeral procession and the approach roads to the same. We had detailed discussions with the army and police officers on these arrangements.

I stopped at Teen Murti House to see the arrangements there and then came to PHQ. I got a message issued at 0800 hours to the SSPs of the surrounding districts that no armed person should be allowed to come across the border and strict vigilance be maintained on the movements of people coming to Delhi.

Another message was issued for provision of force at Delhi and New Delhi railway stations for protection of stranded Sikh passengers there. Orders for lifting of curfew were issued in Delhi, except in P.S. Kalyanpuri.

46. After checking up the situation at the PHQ, I went to Trilokpuri. After seeing the situation there, I reiterated the directions regarding the investigation of the cases, safety and evacuation of the people of the minority community, and intensification of patrolling. A number of suspects who were alleged to be involved in the killing of Sikhs that had taken place on the 1st and 2nd morning were arrested.

While I was returning, a report was received that firing was taking place near Rajdoot cinema near Bhogal between Sikhs and Hindus. I accordingly returned that way but found the situation to be under control, with the local DCP there. I thereafter reached India Gate fifteen minutes before the cortège of the late Prime Minister arrived there, to supervise the arrangements for controlling the crowds in the Central district area, as well as at the cremation ceremony, and the dispersal of the crowds thereafter.

47. I was summoned to the LG's house at 2030 hours foe a meeting, while we were holding discussions, a message came to LG from the residence of V.S. Tripathi at Talkatora Road that Sikhs had collected there and were attacking his house. The LG directed me to proceed there immediately.

When I reached there, I found no such situation there, but it was reported that someone had tried to come into the house from the back, directed LCP New delhi to make adequate police arrangements there and in the area, and also cover the Pakabganj and Bangla Sahib gurdwaras. I thereafter went to police Headquarters. I got a message issued asking for situation reports at 0600 hrs and 1600 hrs every day.

48. Later that night I was informed that the LG had resigned and the Home Secretary, wali had been appointed as Lt. Governor with immediate effect.

49. The situation caused considerably from the 4th onwards. A joint review was undertaken daily and a decision was taken to lift curfew during the day from 0900 hours to 1800 hours in all areas except East district and jurisdiction of Mangolpuri and Sultanpuri in West district.

Apart from remaining on guard against the re-occurrence of any communal violence, the police started concentrating with greater efforts on the investigation of cases, the apprehension of the offenders, recover, and restoration of the stolen property. Property worth about Rs.2.00 crores had been recovered by the time I had handed over. The police also helped in rehabilitating the refugees and protecting them in the cams, many of which were located in the police stations.

50. It was also decided that a senior officer should be appointed to identify and enquire into the cases where police officers had been remiss in the discharge of their duties of also those cases where police officers had displayed initiative and courage in controlling the riots in their areas.

I, would like to add that I was posted as Commissioner Police, Delhi from 29th April 1983, and handed over charge to S.S. Joy on 12th November 1984.

(S.C. Tandon)

---

Witness No. 191

Name : S.C. Tandon

Age :

Occupation : Commissioner of Police, Delhi ( Retd.)

Address :

Without Oath

[The witness has sent a copy of his statement submitted before Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission of Inquiry. The same be taken on record and treated as his evidence]

Reply to Questions put by H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate on behalf of Nov.'84 Carnage Justice Committee.

On 31.10.84 I had no meeting with the Prime Minister. I am not aware of any meeting on 31.10.84 wherein Lt. Governor (LG) had attended in the presence of the Prime Minister. I had no meeting with the Home Minister on 31.10.84. On 1.11.84, I had attended a meeting called by the Home Minister; that was the first meeting and that was in the evening.

I had not received any instructions from the Home Minister either on 31.10.84 or till the evening of 1.11.84 when I attended the meeting. The first message which I received from the Home Secretary was in the morning of 1.11.84 when the dead body of Mrs. Indira Gandhi was kept at Teen Murti House. That message was in connection with the making of proper arrangements at that place as a huge crowd had gathered there and the arrangements already made had broken down.

I was not present at the place where the President's car was stoned near the AIIMS. Since I was busy in other work I could not come to know who were the persons who attacked the Presidents car. I had instructed the DCP (South) to look into that incident. I had not inquired from him thereafter as to who were the assailants.

I cannot say what was the complexion of the mob - whether they were outsiders or local people or whether they were belonging to any political party or not. On 31.10.84, our assessment even after some of the incidents which were reported to us was that the situation was under control. On 31.10.84 itself I had sent messages to the DCPs and other police officers to take effective steps.

Those messages were flashed through wireless from time to time. No specific instructions were given to the police to keep a watch over the areas where there was Congress stronghold. I had not received any report till 11.11.84 as regards how the mobs had collected and whether they consisted of local people or outsiders.

I had not specifically instructed the DCPs to inquire about the complexion of the mobs. On 31.10.84 we had not received any intelligence reports regarding any plans of violence erupting in the area. It is the function of the Addl. CP (CID) to collect intelligence regarding all the activities within Delhi. Nothing unusual was brought to my notice by the Addl. CP (CID) on 31.10.84 or even on 1.11.84.

In my opinion large mobs had gathered at various places mainly on account of the popularity of the late Prime Minister. I had not made any inquiry regarding any violence in East and West District as there were no reports. Had there been such incidents, they would have been reported to us. I was busy with controlling law and order situation in Central, North and New Delhi Districts.

According to me, there was no failure of police because police had taken steps such as arresting the persons who were found indulging in violence. Curfew was imposed in Hauz Qazi area and intensive patrolling continued with the result that by and large the incidents had stopped occurring in Central District. An incident had taken place in Patel Nagar area.

Except that, I did not get any report of any other incident. The DCP of South District had asked me at 1 P.M. for imposition of curfew in the areas of Police Stations Srinivaspuri, Nizamuddin and other areas and I had told him to immediately impose the curfew. I was not aware of the incidents which had taken place throughout 1.11.84 in South District except those which are referred to by me in my statement.

I had not come to know about the incidents which had happened in Palam and South District area on 1.11.84 as they were not reported to me on that day, I had come to know about them later on. The incidents which had taken place in Sultanpuri, Mangolpuri, and Trilokpuri were not brought to my notice immediately but they were brought to my notice later on.

I was told that incidents had taken place in Sultanpuri and therefore I had immediately instructed the DCP to look into them. Apart from these, nothing else was brought to my notice. As regards the incidents in Trilokpuri, somebody had come to my office and had complained that some massacre had taken place. Therefore, Addl. CP Mr. Jatav was sent there.

As regards the incidents which had happened in Mangolpuri, I had spoken to DCP to take appropriate action. I do not recall if the incidents in Nand Nagari were brought to my notice on 1.11.84. I do not recall whether the incidents which had happened there were brought to my notice on 2.11.84. I do not recall if the incidents which had happened in Nangloi area on 1.11.84 were brought to my notice. I do not recall if the incidents which had happened in that area were brought to my notice on 2.11.84.

As far as I remember, action was taken against SHO of Palam area, SHO, P.S. Mangolpuri, SHO of P.S. Sultanpuri and SHO, P.S. Trilokpuri. I cannot recall if no action was taken against those SHOs, except the SHO of P.S. Trilokpuri, and except by way of transfer. I had not come to know as to whether police were registering one case in respect of the incidents taking place within that police station or in one locality falling within that police station.

It was not brought to my notice as to whether shoot at sight orders issued by me were complied with or not. On 2.11.84, I had received reports regarding incidents which had happened in Mangolpuri, Sultanpuri and Trilokpuri. I do not recall if other incidents which happened in other areas were reported to me.

As many incidents had taken place on 2.11.84 inspite of the orders given by me it would mean that there was lapse on some individuals to take effective steps and to feed information to the higher officers. As far as I recollect before I left my post on 11.11.84, a decision was taken to inquire into failure, if any, on the part of local police officers in taking effective steps.

On 1.11.84 when I reached Gurdwara Rakab Ganj mob was still there. I had seen one dead body outside and probably one inside also. When I had gone there I had noticed three Hindu men and three Hindu women inside the Gurdwara and they were brought out by the Granthi on my request. I do not know whether they were employees of the Gurdwara or not.

The mob dispersed thereafter. I had no idea as to whether the same mob which was present there had killed those two persons. When I had gone there the main idea in my mind was that the situation should be controlled. Registration of cases and making arrests etc. was the job of the local DCP and the SHO.

When I had gone to Patel Nagar at the house of Mr. Talwar, I had seen a mob near his house. I found that his house was partly burnt, and five dead bodies of rioters were lying on the road. At that time the army was already there. The DCP and his men were also present there. On my instructions, the DCP and his men rescued Mr. Talwar and his family from the back door. The DCP had done so after going inside the house.

Whatever offences were mentioned in the case registered against Mr. Talwar would have done by the local police. That was not done at my instructions. I am not aware of as to whether anybody from the mob was arrested or not by the police prior to my arrival. I am not aware of as to whether any firing was resorted to or not. The Army had already taken over there.

I had come to know later on, after I had handed over charge, that allegation were made by the victims or their family members against some Congressmen. A DCP is in in charge of the Police Control Room and his duty is to pass on the information to the Addl. Commissioner of Police, Range or Commissioner of Police's Office. An Addl. CP (Administration) was in charge of receiving messages in the absence of CP. He must have been present in the office on 1.11.84.

Read over and found correct.

(S.C. Tandon) (G.T. Nanavati)

23rd April, 2002

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